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Abstract: This papcr analyscs conceptual change. A rejccrion of purL' cxperience 
has prornprcd philnsophers of science to adopt a certain pcrspective from which to 
\'iew changes of belief. Popper. Kuhn, and others have analysed concL'ptual change 
111 cerms of problems or anomalies. that is. in terms of contingent reasoning abour 
issues posed in the context of an inhcrited web of belief. This paper explores a 
more general analysis of conceptual changc in dialogue with thesc philosophe rs of 
sciencc. Srill. hecau~e changes of bdid are not all changes in scicnlific hdief, we 
~eek to unpack concepn1al changc in tcrms of dilemmas. as opposed to anomalics 
or prohlcms. For a Mart. the notion of a d ilemma diffcr has to be bro;1dc r than 
that of an ;momaly ~incc it purports to apply to conceptual change as a whole. 
not just the transition from one era of normal science to another. In addition , we 
~houl<l derach rhe notion of ;1 dilemma from the objectivism of Poppl'r's workl-3 
prohlems. 
Key words: concept. change. belid. dilemmJ. 
Resumen: Este artículo analiza el cambio conceptual. tln rechazo de la experiencia 
pura ha dado lugar a que los filósofos de la ciencia adopten una determinada 
perspectiva desde la cual contemplar los cambios de neencias. Popper, Kuhn y 
otros han analizado d cambio conceptual en términos de problemas o anomalías, 
esto e~. en rérminos de razonamientos contingentes acerca <le temas situados 
en d contexto cll' una red heredada de creencias. F.sra contrihucit'>n indaga un 
análisis nüs general dd cambio conceptual en diálogo con estos ft l!isofos de la 
ciencia. Teniendo presente que lo.~ cambios de creencias no son todos cambios en 
las creencias científicas. tratamos de desarrollar el camhio conceptual en términos 
de dilemas. en oposición a anomalías o problemas. Para comenzar. la noción de 
dilema ha <le ser más amplia que la de anomalía puesto que tiene como objetivo 
aplicarse al cambio conceptual como un todo y no como la transiciún de una era 
de ciencia normal a otra. Adenüs, deberíamos de destacar la noción de dilema a 
partir dd objetivismo <le los problemas del mundo 3 popperiano. 
Palabras clave: (·rmcepto, cambio, creencia, dilema. 
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How should we analyse change in beliefs, concepts, ideas, or thought? 
Two sylized vicws stand as extreme answers to this question. On the one 
hand, logi<:al empiricists might argue that peoplc test their theoretical be-
liefs against pure obscrvations, rnodifying any heliefs that are in conflict 
with these observations; so, they might conclude, we can analyse con-
ceptual change by showing certain observations falsified old heliefs w hile 
providing support for ncw ones. On the other hand, idealists might argue 
that people pursue consistency, modifying beliefs that are in conflict w ith 
one another; so, they might condude , we can analyse conceptual change 
by showing old beliefs contained two contradictory propositions that che 
new ones reconcile in an appropriate way. Most philosophers of science 
over the last thirty years or so have attempted to analyse scientific change 
not in terms of expcricnces or inconsistencies, but in terms of problcms, as 
with Sir Karl Popper, or anomalies, as with Thomas Kuhn 1• 
The emergence of the notions such as problem and anomaly reflect 
a trend in philosophy away from atomistic emp iricism and toward mean-
ing holism and the related notion of the web of belief!. Once philosophers 
accept that no experience can prove conclusively the truth of any given 
proposition, they generally conclude that what we accept as true depends 
on background theorics, albeit background theories hardened by conven-
tion. Once they conclude that what we accept as true depends on back-
ground theories, moreover, they are then prompted either to dismiss ra-
tional thought altogethcr by suggesting that background theories determine 
what we take to he true. or, more plausibly, to equate rational thought with 
attempts to improve background thcories by reflecting on che difficulties we 
find in them and in their relationship to our experience. Hence, contempo-
rary philosophers of science often pose the question of how we should an-
alyse scientific change as one of how to analyse individual reasoning about 
issues that arise against the background of an inherited body of knowledge. 
I want to explore conceptual change more generally through a considera-
tion of che implications of meaning holism and the web of belief. 
St<e rt<,pectively K. Popper, Ohjecti1'<1 Kno1l'iedp,e. Au F.voltllionary• Approach 
!Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972): and T. Kuhn. The Stmcture of Sctenlíjic Rem/11tlons 
<Chicago: University of Chicago Pres.~. 1970). Also sec L. Laudan, Progress and lis Pmble ms 
(llerkclt<y: Universiry of California Press, 1977); and S. Toulmin, Human Umlerstandt11g: The 
Cul/ectiue Use and Hvo/lt/i<m of ()mcepls (Princeron: l'rinceton University Press, 1972). 
1 For an overview of the rrend see E. LePore & ]. Fodor, Hofüm: A Shopper's Gttíde 
(Oxford: Blackwell. 1991). An early and trenchant critique of pure t!Xperience was W Quine, 
·Two Dogmas of Empric1sm·. in From a l ogica/ Point of Vieu• (Camhridge, MA: Harvard 
L'níversity Prt!s.-. 196ll. pp. 20-46. For the extension of meaning holi•m w theories of txlief 
see W. Quinc & ]. Ullían, The Web of Belief (New York: Random House, 1970). 
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Any attempt to bring an analysis of conceptual change into line with 
that of scientific changc is likely to face objections to the implicit equation 
of all conceptual change with the .. reasonable· process that characterises 
science. In fact, however, the very developments in the philosophy and 
history of science to which I havc just refered also have contributed to a 
broader questioning of the model of scientific change asan inherently "rea-
sonabJe .. proccss. This rethinking of science clearly suggests that we should 
operate not with a distinction between scientific and non-scientific change, 
but with one bctween "reasonable· and ·unreasonab[e. change. Although 
a complete analysis of conceptual change would cover both sides of the 
latter distinction, we might begin by offering an analysis of ·reasonable" 
change, while also noting that "tmreasonable· change is that motivated by 
rogue pro-attitudes and so best analysed in terms akin to hot irrationalities 
and even weakness of the wi!P. 
Although the following analysis concerns only .. reasonab[e. conceptual 
change, this <loes not mean that it applies only to cases in which people 
clearly strove over a period of time to devise a response to an anomaly, 
problem, or dilcmma. People often change their beliefs in a flash - the 
resolution of an issue, the answer to a question, comes to them in a mo-
ment. When this happcns they do not seem to arrive at thcir new beliefs 
as a rcsult of a process of deliberation. This does not mean, however, that 
·rcasonable" forms of explanatíon are inappropriate to such cases. We can 
never follow the actual psychological process by which índividuals make 
any conceptual change. Whenever we unpack such a psychological proc-
ess, we do so by describing a series of psychological states - beliefs, pro-
attitudes, and the like. No mattcr how many psychological states we thus 
identify. however, wc always come up against the moment when one gives 
way to another. Wc always come up against the questions of why and how 
an initial psychological statc gave rise to another. Any attempt to analyse 
conceptual change solcly in terms of psychological states necessarily runs 
aground on the rock of the nature of the connections between such states. 
·Reasonable· forms of explanation come into their own in providing us 
with a means of avoiding this rock. They enable us to traverse those mo-
ments when people actually change their beliefs since the concept of ·rea-
sonableness .. provídes us w ith an account of how one psychologícal state 
can arise out of another' . 
See, for example, D . Pears. Motívated In-atio11alitv (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
198-ll. 
The importance of rational or reasonable explanations within the human sciences 
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An analysis of -reaso nahle· conceptual change might begin from the 
philosophy of science as it has developcd during the broader philosophical 
shift from atomistic empiricism ro meaning holism and the web of b elief. 
Meaning holists arguc that a concept. proposition, or belief gains mt:aning 
only within the context of a larger language or web of bdier. One implica-
tion of meaning holism thus appears to he that we should reject the pos-
sibility of pure experience or pun: reason as a hasis for belief formation. 
We can not attach meaning to cxperienccs. or begin to reason. save in the 
context of an existing web of beliefs, which thus influences the content of 
our experiences and reasoning. J'vleaning holism, in implying that there are 
neither pure observations nor self-supporting beliefs. also suggests that no 
single ohservation or logical principie provides a sufficient analysis of con-
ceptual change. Ce11ainly people want their webs of bclief to coincide with 
their experience of real ity. hut their expcrience of reality is theory-laden, so 
an ohservation alone can not require them to change their beliefs. Hence. 
we can not analyse changes o f belicf solely in terms of ohservations or 
experiences. Certainly too people seck lO make their webs of belief con-
sistent. hut their beliefs refer to an externa! world , so rhc consistency they 
seek is consistency in terms of their understanding of the world. Thus, we 
can not analyse changes of helief solcly by refen: nce to the inner logic of 
a tradition or web of belids. Recause webs of belief are networks of inter-
connected concepts mapping onto reality ar various points, we cm analyse 
conceptual change only hy exploring the multiple ways in \Vhich a new 
undcrstancling interacts with an old web of heliefs. Sometimes we \Vil! h ave 
to show how a new experience promoted a new view of old theories. Ar 
other times we will luve ro shmv how a new theory promoced a new inter-
pretation of old experiences. No single starting point underlies ali changes 
of belief. Rather. be liefs develop in a lluctuating process wiú1 ali sons of 
hel ief-; pushing and pulling eme another in ali sorts of \vays. 
Meaning holisrn encourages us to locate conceptual change at the 1110-
menl when agents modify an inherited web o f beliefs in response to anom-
alies, problems. or d ilemmas. To locar<.: conceptual change at this point is to 
suggest that it is a more or less ubiquitous feature of human life. People are 
always confronting slightly novel circumstances that require them to apply 
ha~ long hecn rerognise<l. See frum among man y R. Collingw0<x.I, 7bl! ldl!a of History. ed. T. 
Knox (Oxford: Clan: n<lon Prt:"-'· 19·1<». pp . .205-2:11 ; \V Dray. l.au-,; muf E\plmwti<lll 111 flistory 
(C)xlord: Oxford l 'nin:risty Press. 1957>: l\1. Oakeshott , ·H1swnrnl Event~·. in On /li,rmy aJI(/ 
Other Essays COxf11rd: Ulackwdl. 198:\l. pp · l~-96: and G. von Wrigh1 , F.\'fJ/mul/i<111 011<i 
r·1ul.!1~ttmdin¡; CLondon: Routledge. 1971 l 
See footnole 2 abo\·e. 
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anew the beliefs tbey inherítecl. Moreover, because the beliefs that people 
inherit can not fix the critcria of their own application, when people con-
front novel circumstances, they have to develop their inheritance in what is 
thus a continua! process of conceptual change. \Vhenever people confront 
a new situation, they must extend their inherited concepts to encompass it. 
Even if a tradition, paradigm, or discourse appears to tell people how they 
shoulcl do so, it actually can provide them at most with a guide to what 
they might do, not a rnle decicling what they must do. A tradition or para-
digm can point peopk in a given direction, but the only way they have of 
checking whether they have been true to it is by asking whether thcy and 
their fellow adherents are content with what they eventually decide to do. 
Thus, change occurs even on those occasions when people think they are 
aclhering strictly to a tradition they regarcl as sacrosanct. 
The ubiquity of change also reflects the fact that people always think 
about. ancl perhaps try to improve upon, their inheritance. Every time any-
cme reflects on the concepts they inherit, they are liable to become aware 
of difficulties with those concepts. and their concern to resolve these dif-
ficulties typically \vill then prompt them to modify the concepts. Even if 
people think they are striving only to unclerstand correctly a tradition they 
regard as sacrosanct, their effon to do so will involve their exercising their 
reason, which, in turn, \Vill entai l their developing the traclition . No doubt 
some traditions, such as one based on a single divine revelation, encourage 
their adherents to describe the results of their reasoning as eluciclations, not 
inno\'ations. No doubt, moreover. some traditions, sueh as modern science, 
encourage their adherents actively to seek innovations. In both cases, how-
ever, innovation necessarily occurs if only as a result of the humble effort 
to understand what has gone before. 
Conceptual change does not occur as a series of ranclom fluctuations 
totally unrelated to human agency, nor is it exclusively the result of the 
self-conscious attempts of a few thinkers to devise a more coherent set of 
beliefs; rather, it occurs because \Ve are agents who reflect on the traditio ns 
we inherit in the light of our own experiences ami thereby alter these tradi-
tions in accord with our own reasoning. 
l\.Ieaning holism provicles us \Vith the impetous to search for a general 
analysis of ubiquitous conceptual change along the path already trodden 
by philosophers of science. Nonethdess, we have to modify the theories 
of Kuhn and Popper if we are to make them serve us beyoncl the confines 
of science - we have to re think ,anomalies .. and ·problems• as ·dilernmas•. 
Kuhn in particular is led by his focus on science to take for granted things 
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such as che predominantly empirical nature of beliefs, a high leve! of agree-
ment about background theories, and a share<l comrnitment to advancing 
knowledge througb experimentacion. Even if these assumptions are appro-
priate when one explores the sociology of conceptual change in science, 
they have no place in an analysis o f conceptual change more generally. 
Not eve1yone reasons in the ways that characterise the scientific commu-
nity, so wt: can not explain ali changes in all webs of belief in the ways 
we might explain the changing content of scicntific knowledge. Much of 
our analysis of the concept of a dilemma, therefore, will consist of an em-
phasis on the neecl to ensure that it remains broader than che alternatives 
deployed by philosophers of science. 
A dilemma is a ncw belief which merely by virtue of the fact that one 
accepts it as tme poses a question of one's existing beliefs. It is important 
to recognise here that we can not identify dilemmas exclusively with facts. 
Philosophers of science are incline<l to cliscuss anomalies, problems, and 
the like as if they are typically factual beliefs generated by experiments6. 
Even if they reasonably can do so in so far as they restrict their a ttention 
to the case of science, once we look beyond science we can no longer do 
so. A fact can constitute a dilemma: for example, the <liscovery by Victorian 
geologists that many rocks were far too old to fit into the cosmology that 
theologians had derived from the Bible constituted a dilemma for Chris-
tians who helieved Gencsis required the world to be about five thousand 
years ole!. However, theories that are quite clistant from observations also 
can constitute dilemmas: for example, the theory of evolution proved an 
even greate r stumbling-block than geology for many Victorian Christians. 
Even moral beliefs with little observational content can act as dilemmas: for 
example, Victorian Christians often reacted strongly against talk of hell-fire 
and eternal damnation precisely because they believed these theological 
doctrines were immorar. So, a new understanding can constitue a dilemma 
wherever it might lie on the spectrum that passes from exempla1y p er-
ceptions with little theoretical content to complex theoretical constructions 
with only a d istant basis in perceptions. What turns an understanding into a 
clilemma is the authority it posseses for thc person for whom it constitutes 
a dilemma, and it acquires this authority simply because that person ac-
One notable excepcion is Kuhn's adm1rnhle concern to allow for · inventions, or 
novclties of theory,· as well as ·discovcries o f fact,. an<l his e4ually admirable rewgnition 
of the -excee<lingly anificial· nature of the distinclio n between the twu. Kuhn. Stmctttr<! of 
Scümtific Rec10/utions. p. 52. 
- J. Altholz. ·The Warfare of Conscience wirh Theology·. in .J. Altholz, e<l .. 'fbe M ind 
ami Art of l'ictorian E11gla11d (Minneapolis: University of MinnesOla Press, 1976), pp. 58-77. 
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cepts it as trne. When people accep t an understanding as true, they come 
to believe it, so they incorporate it into their existing webs of belief, and 
they thereby necessarily extend or o the1wise modify their helicfs. 
Whenever \Ve come to believe something new, we confront tht: dilem-
ma of how we are going to incorporate it w ithin our existing web of beliefs. 
Here too we have a contrast between the concept of a dilemma and sitnilar 
concepts found in the philosophy of science . The stability of science - the 
fact that most changes in scientific beliefs extend existing theories rather 
than overturning them - encourages philoso phers of science, notably Kuhn, 
to focus on the rare anomalics that lead scientists to renounce a number 
of entrenched thcories. Anomalies are the rare pieces of factual evidence 
or theoretical innovations that conflict with the then established paracligm. 
In Kulm's vie'N. then, anomalies are responsible only for the occasional, 
revo lutionary transformation: most conceptual change occurs when .scien-
tists extend a ruling paradigm. He says, "resistance guarantees that scientists 
will not be lightly distracted and that the anomalies that lead to paradigm 
change will penetrate existing knowledge to the core·". Dilemmas, in con-
trast, arise ali the time, for they include not only the rare anomalies that 
prompt scicntists to make drastic changes to their wcbs of belief. but also 
the concerns that prompt scientists to extend prevailing theories during a 
period of normal science, ami even the trivial puzzles that lead ali of u.s to 
aclopt new beliefs ali the time in our everyday existence. 
An analysis of dilemmas should distinguish them not only from Kuhn's 
anomalies , but also from the more objectivist problems invoked by Popper. 
Although philosophers of science, induding Kuhn, sometimes appear to 
ascribe to anomalies or prohlems an existence independent of individuals, 
we can often unpack their concepts as inter-subjective emes; we can say 
that the strong consensus among scientists means an anomaly or problem 
in science usually afflicts a number of scientists who share the beliefs that 
give it its character''. Popper, in contrasc, explicitly rejects any such inter-
subjcctive account of p roblems in favour of objectivism. He claims that 
pmblems exist indepcndently of the beliefs of every individual subject. He 
writes , for example, that problems "need not have their conscious counter-
pa1t" and even ·where they havc their conscious counte rpart, the conscious 
Kuhn, Sci<!nlijic Remlutwns, p. 65 
Kuhn, fo r e xample, rather surprisingly talks of anomalies appearing bc:cause of 
a •rc:c:ognition that naturc h;ts somehow vJulated the paradigm-induced expectations that 
govern normal science• Ihid.. pp. 52-3. Surely, however. it h people"s inter-subjcctive be liefa 
about nature. not nature itself. which c:hallcnge par.idigrns. 
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prohlem m:ed nor coincide with the objective prohlem.10. Popper reaches 
his ohjectivist v iew of p rohlems hecause he regards them as clifficulties in 
rheories 1ha1 themselvcs exist independently of eve1y individual subject in 
World-three. 
According to Popper, \Vurld-one is the physical world of particles, 
waves. ancl the like: \X'orld-two is the mental one of states of conscio usness, 
including beliefs. emotions. and the like: and World-three consists of the 
products of consciousncss. such as theoretical systems, cri!ical arguments, 
and problems. World-three consists of objectivc rhoughts that possess an 
autonomous existcnce quite apart from the actual beliefa of individ uals: it 
contains !he intended and uninrende<l products of individual minds in so 
far as thcy persis! indepen<lently of a ll minds in things such as biological 
organs. language. ami books. 
TI1e weakness of Pop ¡x:r's posi!ion appears in thc notio n that the the-
ories. arguments, ancl problems puhlished in journals ::.md books are mere 
marks on pages apart from when particular indivi<luals attach meanings to 
them. As marks on pages. moreover. they are meaning less, an<l so do not 
constitute theories. argume nts, and prohlems at ali. A theory is a theory 
only if it is held hy somcone. What is more. hecause there are no theories 
in a Popperian World-rhn.:e. there can not be objective prohlcms afl1icting 
them. Hecause any theory must be a suhjective or inrersubjective one held 
by panicular in<lividuals. problems nrnst be suhjective o r intersubjectivc 
dilemmas. 
Imagine that Popper reconstructed an ohjective World-three problem-
situation as X, w here X makes it rational for scientists to helie\'e Y. so that 
Popper could explains a scicntist believing Y by saying it was the rational 
th ing to do in the situation X. Imagine now, however, that the scien tist's 
suhjecti\'e understan<ling of the prohlcm-siluation in \Xforld-two was Z, not 
X. Surcly 've cm not accept Popper's analysis tha t the scientist hdievcd Y 
because the pro blem-situation was X? Surcly we must analyse thc relevant 
concepmal change in tcrms of the scicnrist comíng to believe Y in the con-
text of his or her suhjectivc unclerstan<ling Z? 
Let us turn now from the dilemmas that inspire changes of belief to 
the nature of the changes they inspire. The way people respond to any 
gin:n dilcmma rdlects hoth the character of the clilemma and the content 
of their existing wehs of bdid. Consider the influence of the character o f a 
1
" Popper, OIHecfire KmnrleJRe. p. 2~2. 
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dilemma on the changes people make in response to it. When confronted 
with a new understanding, people must e ither reject it or develop their 
existing beliefa to accommodate it. If they reject ir, their beliefs will re main 
unchanged. If they de\·elo p their beliefs to accommodate ir, they must do 
so in a way that makes room for it, so thc modifications they make to their 
belids must rdkct its character. To face a dilemma is to ask w hat an au-
thoritat ivc understanding says about how the world is, and. of course, to 
ask a qucstion is always to adopt a perspective from whic:h to loo k for an 
answer. Every dilemma thus points us to ways in which we might resolve 
it. For example, se\·eral Victorians resolved the conflict they perceived be-
1\veen faith al1(1 the theory of evolution by arguing that God is irnmanent 
in the evolution:lly process - God worked through natural processes in the 
\vorld , rather tban inteffcning miraculously from beyond. They recunciled 
the thco1y of evolution with a belief in God by presenting the eYolutionary 
process as itself a manifcstation of God's will. Their new web of beliefs 
induded a n.:ligious rendition of the new underst:rnding th:.ll const iluted a 
dilemma for them. 
Consider now the influence of people·s exL~ting webs of belief on the 
nature uf the changes they make in response 10 a dilemma. lf peoplc are 
tu acconunodate a new understanding, they must hook it on to aspects of 
their existing belicfs, whcrc the content uf their existing beliefs makes cer-
tain hooks available to them. To find a home for a new belief among their 
existing emes, they have to connect the two, and the connections they can 
make clepend on the nature uf their existing beliefs. When we react to a 
clilemma. we do so by drawing on themes already present in o ur beliefs, 
and this means that these themes necessari ly influence the way in which 
our beliefs change. For cxample, thc pamheistic heliefs associated with 
the romantics provicled sorne Victorians \Vith a hook on which to hang a 
theory of evolution. They moved from a pantheistic faith in nature as a 
mude of Gocl's being by way uf the theory of evolution to an immanentist 
fa ith according to which God worked bis will through natural processes 
in the world. They reconciled the theory of evolution with faith in God 
by hooking the former on to pantheistic themes in their existing beliefs. 
Their new web of heliefs incorporated an cvolutionary rendition of them es 
drawn from thei r o lcl one. 
After people find hooks in their existing wehs of belief on which ro 
hang the understanding constitutive o f a dilemma, they have to go on to 
modify severa! more uf their existing beliefa. To see why th is is so, we 
need to rememhcr that meaning holism implies that our beliefs map onto 
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realily only as webs. Thus, a change in any one belief requires compensat-
ing and corresponding changes to be made to other, related heliefs . A new 
understanding affocts a web of beliefs somewhat as a stone does a pool of 
water into which it falls - a <listurbance occurs at the place where the stone 
e nters the water, and from then: ripples sprea<l out, gradually fading away 
as onc recedes from the centre of the d isturbance. Once again, the addi-
tional cl1anges people thus make to their hel icfa rdlect both the character 
of thc <lilenuna an<l thc content of thcir existing beliefs. Each adjustment 
they make enriches the themes that bring the new underst:.mding into a 
coherent relationship with their existing beliefs. 
The process of conceptual change is an open-cnded one in that pople 
resolve dilemmas by creatively using their current webs of belief rather 
than by passively following them. Here passively to follow a web uf beliefs 
would be to draw out consequences already contained within it: the exist-
ing web of beliefs would fix the way in which someone resolved the di-
lemma. The notion that people might simply apply their beliefs appears to 
be undermined by one rendition uf Wittgenstein's aecount of rule-following 
- no rule, no web of beliefs, can define the criteria of its own applica-
tion11. So, any existing web of beliefs provides hints as to how one m ight 
procee<l, but it is always possible for someone to neglect any given hint. 
Whenever people use a web of beliefs to respond to a dilemma, they draw 
on its resources as a guide to how to modify their beliefs to accommodate 
the understanding constitutive of the dilemma. Nonetheless, people's exist-
ing beliefs will suggest severa! ways of resolving any <lilemma, and the only 
way they have of checking the adequacy of the particular \vay in which 
they happen to use their existing beliefs is to ask if they and their fellows 
are content with the way in which they do so. No doubt some changcs of 
belief seem to entail nothing more than the passive following of an existing 
web of belicfs. However, these cases are merely those when we happen 
to accept the a<lequacy of the way in which the people concerned used 
their beliefs to resolve the relevant dilemma. \Vhenever we think people 
appliecl their beliefs in the way they should havc done, we will be inclined 
to say that they were true to thcir beliefs. \Ve will say such things, however, 
simply because we judge it is so, not because the ir application uf their old 
beliefs corresponds to criteria fixed by those beliefs. 
It is perhaps worth pausing here to note that because wcbs of belief 
<lo not circumscribe the ways in which people might develop thcm in re-
11 L. Wittgenstein , Pln/osophicu/ f111 'es1ip,atirms. tr.ms G . Ansrnmbc <Oxfcm.I: 
Blackwdl. 1972). SS. 14.:\-242. 
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sponse to a dilemma. we can not predict with any cenainty how people 
will respond to a dilemma. Even if we have knowle<lge of their existing 
beliefs an<l the dilemma, ali we can offer is an informed conjecture12• The 
implication of this inability to pred ict is, of course, that there is something 
amiss in too straightforward an assimilation of the explanation of con cep-
tual changes to the model of causation associated with the natural sciences. 
We have found that a dilenuna is a new belief, where any new be-
lief, merely by virtue of being adopted, poses a question of the web of 
beliefs into which it is inserte<l. A <lilemma thus arises whenever people's 
reflections in relation to their experiences lea<l them to adopt a new un-
derstanding as authoritative. Although our theories always enter into our 
experiences, our experiences still influence the beliefs we eventually come 
to hold since they pose questions for the heliefs we inherit. The notion of 
a dilemma thus provides one way of acknowledging the importance of the 
natural and socia l worlds as influences upon our concepts. 
Attempts to rdate our concepts to experience raise the question of 
whether or not we cm privilege one type of experience, or understanding 
thereof, as the sole or primary source of conceptual change. Do economic, 
political, o r sorne other set of experiences - or do epistemological, semiot-
k , or some other set of understandings - have a privileged role as a source 
of conceptual change? The generality of the notion of a d ilemma certainly 
suggests that we might ask whether we can reduce d ilemmas to a specific 
type of experience or understandíng - whether that be economic exp eri-
ences, semiotic theories, or the quest for pmver an<l officell. 
If we could reduce dilemmas to a single type of unclerstanding, then 
all o f our beliefs would take theír validity from that basic type of under-
standing. In contrast, meaning holism ímplies that our beliefs resemble a 
spherical web, not a pyramicl. Our beliefs do not fo llow from one another 
in a chain securec.l at a single point to a particular type of theo1y-laden 
experience. Rather, our beliefs all draw support from une another as they 
" Je has heen argued that the language in w hich we d iscus.' heliefs does not e ven 
prnv1tle a mean' of making su<·h conjectures bu t only of living tog<:!her. See A. Morton, 
·Folk Psychology is not a Pn:tlicrive Device·. /l,fí11d 105 (1996), 119-37. Surely, however, it 
enables us to live rogether precisley because it pro,·ides us with a me:m s of making such 
conjectures. 
13 See respectively K. Marx, ·Preface to A Critique of Pulitica/ Eccmom.1'. in Karl 
Mar:>.·: Selected \flrltin;¡s, etl. D. McLellan (Oxfor<l: Oxforcl lln iversity Pres,, 1977), pp. 388-
391; M. Foucault, 7be Order uf ThillJ.<S (Lon<lon: Tavistock, 197 1 ); an<l L. Namier, ·Human 
Nature in Politics·. in Persona/ities ami Pr111·ers (London : Harper Torchbooks, 19551, p. 4. 
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map onto reality as a compl<.:x whole. Again, no one type of exp erience 
c.::111 fi x the belief-; we come to hokl because we play an active role in con-
structing our experi<.:nces in terrns of our current webs of belief, and these 
webs of belief incorporare belids about th ings other than any one type of 
experiencc. 
Ali our experiences ancl ali our lx:liefs link up wi th one another - they 
form a seamless web. Although wc can categorise a specific set o f expe-
riences ami bclieb as such ami such an arca of life, the categories we 
deploy <lo not dernarcate isolated, self-sufficient areas of lite. Moreover, 
because a l! areas of life thus depend on others, we c m not identify any 
arca of life as authoritative over al! others. Most individuals. for example, 
have experiences of work and of God. and tht::se experiences are saturated 
with thei r existing economic and religious beliefs. which . in turn, inter-
penetrate w ith the rest of their webs of belief. This means. first. that their 
understand ing of work and of faith interact with each other because they 
exist as parts of a single worldview, ancl, secondly, thal we can not re duce 
either typt:: of undcrstanding to the other since their interaction is recipro-
cal. A rcligious belief can influence one's political views: a spiritual belief 
in the importance of detaching oneself from the world might lead someone 
to political quietism. Equally, however, an understanding associated w ith 
work can influence one's relig ious v iews: a belief that a denomination fa-
vours an cconomic group might lead someone to worship elsewhere. The 
different arcas of life are neither independent of one another nor reducible 
to one another. 
CONCLl'SJOt-; 
Human scientists are still indinec! to treat conceptual change as if it 
vvere a product either of autonornous human agency or of the inter na! 
logic of a tradition or d iscourse. Recent philosophy of science. in contras!, 
encourages us ro analysc such change in terms of individual reasoning 
within rhe context of an inherited web of belief. Conceptual change arises, 
in other worcls, as people respond to anomalies orO problems. 
However, although recent philosophy of scit::nce, tied as n is to a 
broad holism, encourages us to analyse conceptual change in some su ch 
fashion. the more detaile<l concent it ascribes to the notions of an anomaly 
o r problem can not always be adoptcd wholcsale to an analysis of su ch 
change in general. In particular. we nee<l to adopt a norion such as dilern-
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ma that, firstly, avoids the objectivism associated with Popper's notion of a 
problem. and, secondly, covers not only the dramatic shifts rhat Kuhn ex-
p lo res in te rms o f anomalies hut also the more mundane everyday changes 
of normal scienn: and everyday lite. A dilemma here consists of any new 
he lie f. wh ich. merely be vi rtue o f our entertaining it , forces a reconsidera-
tio n, and so development, of our existing web o f bel iefs. Alrhough s u ch 
dil<.:mmas can arisl:' from novel the01y-laden experiences, thcy can also 
arise from theories with little din:cr ohscrvational content. EYen whcn they 
do arise frorn expcriences, moreover, we cannot identify any one type of 
expe rience as uniquesly responsib lc for them. 
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